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ABSTRACT: The social intuitionist approach to moral judgments advanced 
by social psychologist Jonathan Haidt presupposes that it is possible to provide 
an explanation of the human moral sense without normative implications. By 
contrast, Iris Murdoch’s philosophical work on moral psychology suggests that 
every description of morality necessarily involves evaluative features that reveal 
the thinker’s own moral attitudes and implicit philosophical pictures. In the light 
of this, we contend that Haidt’s treatment of the story about Julie and Mark, 
two siblings who decide to have casual, protected, and in his view harmless sex, 
provides a too simplistic picture of what is involved in understanding human 
morality. Despite his aim to explain the roots of moral judgments, he fails to 
provide a deeper understanding of morality in two different respects. First, he 
does so by suggesting that his story contains all the relevant information needed 
to take a moral stand on it, and by rejecting as irrelevant the wider human context 
in which questions about sexual and family relations arise. Second, he simplifies 
the responses of the people who are subject to his experiment by disregarding 
their various reasons for disapproving and by equating understanding human 
morality with explaining an impersonal psychological process. 
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Introduction
How difficult is it to understand human morality, and in what does this 
difficulty reside? Present attempts to explain the workings of morality 
within empirical moral psychology, often presuppose that it is possible to 
give a description of the human moral sense without normative implications 
(see e.g. Haidt 2013, 316; Haidt and Pinker 2016). Thus, they suggest that 
the matter of explaining the roots of morality, although it may be improved 
by theoretical and methodological reconsiderations, does not itself pose to 
us any potentially ethical questions about what is involved in reaching an 
understanding of what is entailed in moral reflection. This runs contrary to 
more phenomenological and hermeneutic stances in continental philosophy. 
According to these the question of understanding different forms of human 
thought and practice poses a crucial challenge to any academic discipline 
attempting to describe aspects of human life, since it requires us to address the 
question of what it means to understand another person and her experiences 
(see e.g. Dilthey 1922; Spranger 1980; Scheler 2017; Winch 2008). From 
such a perspective, considerations as to what is involved in understanding 
the moral lives of persons are not reducible to, but rather prior to any form 
of explanation of a general sub-personal system (see Backström et al. 2019).
Here, we will supplement the approach offered by phenomenology and 
philosophical hermeneutics with the viewpoint of philosopher and novelist 
Iris Murdoch. Murdoch is an early, but often not fully appreciated, interpreter 
of the philosophical and ethical issues concerned when exploring questions 
regarding our moral psychology. Attending to the evaluative features of 
the language present in our descriptions of human psychology, Murdoch 
proposed that no philosophical or psychological description of morality can 
ever be purely descriptive. It is by necessity expressive of the thinker’s own 
moral attitudes and implicit philosophical pictures about what characterizes 
human life and thought. These considerations extend to how we understand 
a particular person, and how we construe understanding human beings 
more generally. They also surface in the analysis of moral understanding 
and the difficulty of understanding we find illuminative and satisfactory. 
Therefore, a central feature of moral reflection is to explore the conceptual 
frameworks we use to investigate the thoughts and actions of other people, 
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to make ourselves aware of the philosophical pictures that implicitly lead 
our descriptions of the central features of morality and moral reasoning. 
(See Bagnoli 2012 and Diamond 1996; 2010 for an overview of what such 
an exploration could entail).
In the light of this more complicated vision of what is involved in 
understanding human morality, we contend that the simplified thought 
experiments used in empirical moral psychology to garner results that help 
explain the foundations of morality (cf. Huebner 2011), involve a reduction 
of the moral character of our reflection and reasoning. We exemplify this 
attitude by analyzing the theoretical perspective and methodological starting 
points of social psychologist Jonathan Haidt, as they take shape in the story 
about Julie and Mark, two siblings who decide to have casual, protected, and 
in his view harmless sex. 
We bring out two respects in which Haidt’s underlying picture of 
morality circumscribes his description of moral reflection and underplays 
the evaluative features of his language use. The first concerns his treatment of 
the story, the second his treatment of the responses of the research subjects 
to it. In the first part, we submit that Haidt simplifies what is happening in 
the fictive relationship between Julie and Mark, by treating a richer context as 
irrelevant to understanding the characters of his story. This makes it difficult 
for the readers to take a moral stand on the story. In the second part, we 
show that Haidt simplifies what is involved in giving reasons for thinking 
that something is morally wrong, by treating the reasons the persons subject 
to his experiment give as irrelevant for gaining moral understanding. This, 
we argue, is a consequence of him taking understanding “the human moral 
sense”, or “human moral life” (Haidt 2001, 829) to consist in explaining the 
psychological process of an intuitive approval or disapproval. 
By contrast to Haidt’s view of what is involved in understanding other 
people’s moral responses and actions, we suggest that the failure to understand 
someone is not merely an intellectual failure. Murdoch’s suggestion that the 
one who does not take into consideration how people think of their own 
actions is inattentive to their vision of life, rather introduces the matter of 
understanding in a way that is constitutively moral. 
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1. Taking examples too easily
The story about Julie and Mark originates in an unpublished study in social 
psychology (Haidt, Bjorklund and Murphy 2000). It is cited by Haidt on 
several occasions (2001, 814; 2006, 20–21; 2013, 45), with slight variations 
in the wording of the final question. The variation of the story we focus on 
appears in his widely cited article, “The Emotional Dog and its Rational 
Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment” (2001), in which 
Haidt uses the results from the study to argue for what he terms a social 
intuitionist approach to moral judgments. This approach is a form of present-
day sentimentalism, in which Haidt defends the Humean claim that our 
moral judgments in the end are based on emotional reactions. The story 
with which he begins his more theoretical discussion reads,
Julie and Mark are brother and sister. They are traveling together in France 
on summer vacation from college. One night they are staying alone in a cabin 
near the beach. They decide that it would be interesting and fun if they tried 
making love. At the very least it would be a new experience for both of them. 
Julie was already taking birth control pills, but Mark uses a condom too, just 
to be safe. They both enjoy making love, but they decide not to do it again. 
They keep that night as a special secret, which makes them feel even closer 
to each other. What do you think about that? Was it OK for them to make 
love? (Haidt 2001, 814)
When confronted with the story, Haidt says, most people immediately react 
to what Julie and Mark did as wrong. When they try to give reasons for 
thinking so, however, they point to possible harms of incest, harms that the 
story states are not involved. This leaves the research subjects in a state of 
what Haidt calls “moral dumbfounding”. Many say things like “I don’t know, I 
can’t explain it, I just know it’s wrong.” (Haidt, Björklund and Murphy 2000; 
Haidt 2001, 814; Sommers 2005; Haidt and Björklund 2008, 197–198; 
Haidt 2013, 29, 47). 
On the bases of these reactions, Haidt rejects the rationalist models of 
morality that, according to him, dominate philosophy and psychology (Haidt 
2001, 815–816). The rationalist models, he submits, presuppose that moral 
judgments are caused by a “process” of “moral reasoning” (Haidt 2001, 818). 
However, since there, to him, is no acceptable reason for objecting to the story 
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of Julie and Mark, that is, a reason that points out that their actions cause 
harm, the research subjects can give no reason for thinking it was not OK. 
This leads him to conclude that moral judgment is not caused by a “process” 
of “moral reasoning”, but rather by a “process” of “moral intuition” (Haidt 2001, 
818, see Stanley et al. 2019, 121, fn 3, 126, for a criticism of depicting this as 
a causal relationship). Intuition to Haidt is a “kind of cognition, but it is not 
a kind of reasoning” (Haidt 2001, 814. Cf. Haidt and Björklund 2008, 200; 
Haidt and Kesebir 2010, 802; Haidt 2013, 56.) In this social intuitionist 
approach, “moral reasoning” is a form of post-hoc rationalization generated 
after the moral judgment has been intuitively made (Haidt 2001, 829). 
Haidt’s model, and the setup of his experiment have been criticized 
from different perspectives both within psychology (Royzman et al. 2015; 
Stanley et al. 2019) and philosophy (Huebner 2011; Jacobson 2008; 2012; 
Jusaszek 2016). Alternative models for explaining the system underlying 
our moral responses have also been suggested (Greene et al. 2009; Hennig 
and Hütter 2020; Tetlock et. al. 2000). What interests us here, however, 
is not possible flaws in the empirical design of his study (Royzman et al. 
2015), or alternative ways of fitting his empirical results to some pre-existing 
philosophical theory (Stanley et al. 2019). neither do we take a stand on how 
one philosophically should consider the role of emotion, or intuition in moral 
judgment (Kronqvist 2017). What interests us is rather the philosophical and 
ethical ramifications of the telling of this story, as well as the philosophical 
presuppositions about morality guiding Haidt’s choice and use of it. 
Haidt’s interpretation of the results of this study stirs debates about 
how empirical psychological research should matter for philosophical 
conceptualization (Kauppinen 2014; Sie 2014). He offers them as evidence 
for and against different philosophical positions, and thus assumes that the 
facts he and his colleagues present should matter for theory. By contrast, 
we emphasize that results produced by an empirical study are already 
determined by theory. They suggest deeply held philosophical positions 
that often go unacknowledged. Therefore, when Haidt presents his results 
as facts of human moral life, he fails to acknowledge that these facts are not 
simple products of our life. They are as much products of his theoretical and 
methodological framework, his definitions and operationalizations. Given 
that we accept these as legitimate, there is of course nothing stopping us 
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from considering his results as facts. It is, however, not these facts that give 
him his methodology.
Many have remarked on the utilitarian strand in Haidt’s thinking, in 
its focus on harmful consequences for determining the right action ( Jusaszek 
2016). Haidt himself also advocates a form of Durkheimian utilitarianism 
on a political level (Haidt 2013, 316). More central to our concern, however, 
is his general emphasis on moral reflection as a means of passing judgments 
on actions and consequences of actions, and on other judgments and their 
underlying mental causes. Attending to these underlying assumptions about 
morality and the role they play in the creation of empirical facts, is necessary 
to think lucidly about what may be philosophically gathered about our moral 
psychology on the basis of this and similar empirical studies. Reconsidering 
the language offered by standard normative and metaethical theories to 
capture what is central to moral reflection, may as well prove necessary to 
account for diverging aspects of our moral psychology. (Landy and Uhlman 
2018 offer a similar criticism of moral psychological accounts as being 
action centered. They suggest that moral judgmentss serve to characterize 
virtues. Cf. Crary 2007; 2016; Diamond 1988; 1995abc; 2003; Gaita 2004; 
Winch 1989, especially chapter 4-5, for expositions of what is central to 
moral reflection that lie close to what our alternative would be to focusing 
judgment on action.)   
The story of Julie and Mark is intentionally set up to fend off any of 
the standard objections one could raise against sexual intercourse between 
two siblings (Haidt 2013, 46; Sommers 2005). In response to the argument 
that the siblings may be hurt in some way, perhaps emotionally, Haidt even 
asserts that “the story makes it clear that no harm befell them” (Haidt 2001, 
814). For Haidt, there are no reasons people can give why it is harmful, 
except their feelings of its being so. Haidt, thereby, invites us to think of the 
story as one containing all the relevant information that is needed to judge 
whether a sexual relationship between brother and sister is OK. 
Yet, it is precisely on this point that one can question the story. In 
our ordinary life, the reflection on what is relevant information, and how to 
determine whether we do indeed have all the relevant information, is itself 
a moral issue. Even more, we are often challenged to see just what the moral 
issue is in a specific situation, or whether we do indeed face a moral problem 
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(cf. Rosaldo 1997, 143–144). Thinking through the following imagined 
situations may clarify these moral features of the story about Julie and Mark. 
They also bring to the table some tensions that unintentionally appear to 
be introduced in it.
Imagine that Julie and Mark are not brother and sister, but friends. 
They are also friends of mine (Kronqvist). Suppose that Julie one day 
confesses to me that she and Mark have made love, on similar premises as 
the ones in Haidt’s story. She wonders whether it was OK for them to do it? 
now, the most obvious response on my part would be to ask why she raises 
that question. This is an obvious response since there are several contexts in 
which this question would not arise. If she, for instance, tells me this as part 
of a story of how they came to fall in love, the worry that this was not OK is 
already precluded. We may, however, imagine several possible situations in 
which the question does arise, and gives Julie reason to worry.
Scenario 1. She tells me that Mark had been a tender lover in all possible 
respects, but that he, during love making repeatedly, had made a sound that 
from the first moment struck her as ridiculous. This had distracted her and 
made it difficult for her to take the act seriously. Even if they had agreed 
that everything was fine afterwards, she now kept hearing that sound every 
time she looked at him. It made her want to laugh. She was afraid this might 
create an unbridgeable gap in their friendship.
Scenario 2. She tells me that the love making started in a tender way, but 
that Mark at a point had turned rougher. He started to say “dirty things” to 
her, and at some point, also slapped her. She had been surprised and had not 
said anything about it during the act. In part, she said, she had also enjoyed it, 
although she admitted feeling ashamed to confess it now. Afterwards, however, 
she noticed that she could not stop thinking about what happened. She felt, 
she said, degraded. This, she added, was not only an effect of what he had 
done, or how she had felt. Rather, she thought it had revealed an unexpected 
side of him that she had trouble accepting. The thought that precisely he had 
believed that she would appreciate such language and behavior both unnerved 
and appalled her. Especially, it brought to mind previous conversations they 
had had where both had agreed that mainstream pornography is very often 
misogynic in its representation of what men and women want from sex. She 
could not make sense of his behavior in the light of these remarks. 
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Scenario 3. She tells me that although she had taken the decision to 
have sex quite lightly, partly induced by considerable amounts of alcohol, 
something had changed after the act. When he, quite casually, had put his 
arm around her, she had felt a warmth and longing she was not expecting. 
When the next morning he had suggested that although the sex was good, 
it was probably for the best not to do it again, she had readily agreed. When 
he started talking, however, she admitted that she first had wished him to 
suggest that they would be something more than only friends. She did not 
know what to make of her feelings.
If I am Julie’s friend and she tells me one of these stories, there are many 
things for me to say, and many things to feel. Indeed, if I imagine Julie’s story 
as one being told by my real friends, I can imagine quite different reactions, 
depending on which of my friends it concerns, their personal histories and 
relationships, the relationship I have to them, the occasion when I would learn 
about it, and so on. I can also think of more or less appropriate reactions. I 
hope, for instance, that I would not be too disturbed by what I am told, to be 
able to listen to the story as a true friend. A more awkward response would 
be feeling jealous about Julie’s sexual experience with Mark.
How I would react to any of these stories in a real situation, is an 
empirical question, as is the question how anyone else would react. Our 
interest in these scenarios, however, is not in determining the range of possible 
responses that may be revealed in an empirical study. neither is it in the 
ethically more normative question about whether it was OK for the Julie 
of our stories to enter a sexual relationship with Mark, or whether some of 
my envisioned reactions are more appropriate than others according to some 
moral norm or standard. Our concern is rather with the role the evaluative 
features of the descriptions used in explicating the experiences, actions and 
reactions of the particular sexual relationship have in these three cases, as well 
as with the evaluative features of the possible re-descriptions I, or someone 
else, may offer against the backdrop of them.
Suppose, for instance, that I, in the first scenario, tell Julie off for being 
“foolish” for “getting hung up on something so silly”. Compare this with urging 
her to see that in the second one “he was being abusive”, or just “acting like a 
jerk”. Consider the argument that may ensue when I, in the third scenario, tell 
her that she was perhaps “falling in love with him”, at the same time as another 
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friend rebukes her for only “telling herself it might be something more”. All 
these descriptions and re-descriptions of what happened suggest various 
paths our thinking morally about these scenarios may follow. They suggest 
different evaluations that may actualize in thinking through the stories. 
The sheer possibility of making such varied descriptions of their 
situation, we here suggest, with Murdoch, invokes “the great variety of the 
concepts that make up a morality” (1997c, 73). They draw attention to how 
critical the words we use to describe or re-describe a situation is for our 
moral evaluation of it. If in the concrete contexts of our life, we are asked to 
respond to whether it was OK for someone to do something, considering 
such questions about how best to describe what happened, is critical in order 
to make sense of what it means for them to be raising this question as well 
as the kind of question they are raising. Is it, say, really a moral question, and 
if so what could serve as a morally appropriate response to it? Listening to 
their answers, and the terms in which they frame their answer, even realizing 
that they do not have an answer, is as critical to this endeavor. 
Thus, we cannot exclude as a matter of principle that these concerns 
about how to describe what happened between our Julie and Mark, are of 
no relevance to the kind of study that Haidt wishes to pursue. Attempting 
to judge whether what they did was wrong, or not OK, only gives a limited 
view into the kind of moral questions the different scenarios may raise. 
The questions, in any of the envisioned scenarios, whether what happened 
between them would harm their friendship, or whether she or he in different 
ways had betrayed their friendship require different kinds of judgment than 
the mere judgment that their act under a certain description was wrong. The 
uncertainty surrounding whether Mark’s way of acting was, for instance, 
abusive is quite different from the acknowledgment that saw as a form of 
abuse it was not OK. (Cf. Hertzberg 2013, 163, who rejects the suggestion 
that someone may not know that abuse, or in his case betrayal, is wrong as 
a “philosopher’s fantasy.”)
It might be objected from someone sympathetic to Haidt’s aims, 
that what we are doing in suggesting these scenarios is altering the original 
story in such a way that they are no longer comparable. In our scenario, 
we introduce doubt and hesitation, mixed feelings and emotions, whereas 
such hesitation is lacking in the original story. Does not Haidt’s story “make 
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clear” that they enjoyed having sex? That their decision not to do it again 
was mutual? And that they grew closer after this? We are aware of this. Yet, 
that is precisely our problem. By contrast to saying that we know enough 
about how two people, not to say two siblings, felt about their love-making 
if we are told that they enjoyed it, we suggest that we actually know too little 
to be able to make a moral judgment. (See Strandberg 2020, for a similar 
criticism of the unclarities called forth by the suggestion that we take this 
as a moral question.)
One thing we do not know is how we are supposed to determine that 
this is the case. Haidt’s story introduces an omniscient observer, someone 
who states with certainty what they felt. “They enjoyed it.” “The decision was 
mutual.” nevertheless, it is not clear what underlies these general descriptions. 
Who says this, and how does that person know? Does he base such a claim 
on observation or on hearsay? Suppose I hear the story about my friends 
from another friend, saying the same thing as in Haidt’s story. Then I may 
take my friend’s word for it, but I may also be skeptical about what my friend 
says and call it into doubt. I may go on to raise other questions. “How did 
Julie look when she said it?” I may even refuse to take my friend’s word for 
it. “Yes, I know she might have said so, but what if she only did it to end the 
conversation, or because she couldn’t admit to herself what she felt.” “She says 
such things all the time, but then she reacts differently.” I am not obliged to 
accept one description of what happened as the best description, just because 
my friend or Haidt told me so.
There are also features of the descriptions making up the story that 
introduce reasons to doubt what we are being told. The mere fact that the 
story does not end with the more open-ended question “What do you think 
about that?”, but by asking “Was it OK for them to make love?”, cautions us to 
think that there may be reason for us to worry about what happened. Why 
raise the question in any other case? The fact that what we are consequently 
told is aimed at subduing any such worries augments this impression. We 
are not told that they enjoyed it and that they grew closer by it for the sake 
of reaching a deeper understanding of how such an episode may affect the 
relationship between brother and sister, as well as their relations to family 
and friends. On the contrary, what we are told serves as a rhetorical device 
to block all possible objections we are imagined to have in relation to it. 
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Mark and Julie’s decision not to make love again, although they 
enjoyed it, and to keep their love-making a secret, also suggests that by their 
own lights, there is something that is not OK with their situation. We may 
have several reasons not to do something although we enjoyed doing it. We 
may not have the occasion to do it again, we may not be in the mood, etc. 
Expressly deciding against it, or keeping it a secret, however, is a different 
matter. If we enjoy doing something, and do not see anything wrong with 
it, it is intelligible and even expectable to think that we want to do it again, 
and do not mind telling others about it. Our enjoying it is in that case reason 
enough for us to do it.
Haidt, in an interview, suggests that the main point of the story is to 
present a picture of consensual sex between adults where no harm is involved, 
but where we are nevertheless caused to act with disapproval (Sommers 2005; 
see Haidt 2013, 45–48). The story is set in France where there are no legal 
prohibitions against incest between consenting adults (cf. Sommers 2005; 
Singer 2014.). The decision “not to do it again” (Haidt 2001, 814), is meant 
to fend off the possible complication of having a brother and sister involved 
in a longer sexual relationship, including issues such as having to explain it to 
their families, and possible offspring. Assuring the reader that they will “keep 
that night as a special secret” (Haidt 2001, 814), targets the emotional harm 
Julie and Mark could experience by others’ judgmental attitudes, considering 
that everyone would tend to react to what happened as not just not OK, but 
wrong in fundamental ways they may not be able to explain. 
Thus, he assumes that “consensual sex between adults” is the most 
salient re-description of their situation, with the common, or liberal, 
understanding in the background that as such it provides no reason for 
moral concern. We suggest that this redescription can be disputed, and that 
the descriptions used to tell the story themselves already signal a potential 
harm in what we are told. (Cf. Stanley et al. 2019, who therefore suggest that 
moral judgment rather target the likelihood of harm). Even using Haidt’s 
own terms, it is not clear that “consensual sex between adults without harmful 
consequences” necessarily overrides the description of the case as one of 
“incest”, with the common understanding of this as wrong. Just as little as 
“consensual sex between adults that does not involve harm”, in a different 
case, it must not be seen as overriding the description “cheating on a spouse”. 
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Summing up, the example underwrites the notion that understanding 
human morality is simple on two accounts. First, it does so, by suggesting 
that the story contains all the relevant information to judge it morally. Here, 
we have shown that as it stands, it does not provide adequate grounds for 
thinking about its moral meaning, since it is still open to what the morally 
relevant description is. Second, it does so by disregarding that the framing 
of the story itself – the question of whether it was OK, as well as the words 
used to describe Julie and Mark – offers occasion to think of what they 
did as wrong. It does not only present us with a row of events and actions 
that we should take a moral stand on, but already involves us in a common 
understanding of a much more complicated communicative landscape set 
within the context of our lives with other human beings. Within such a 
context, we are asked to take a stand on a range of questions about what is 
involved in being brothers and sisters going on vacation, enjoying something, 
having secrets, and having sex. (Cf. Diamond’s remark that being “able to use 
the concept ‘human being’ is to be able to think about human life and what 
happens in it”, 1988, 266, as well as her suggestion that a life with the concept 
of a “brother” involves the understanding that a brother is not someone about 
whom one should entertain sexual fantasies, 1995b, 325). 
Attending to such conceptual questions about how to describe our 
actions and relationships alert us to a moral dimension of meaning beyond 
the kind of “moral judgmentss” that Haidt is interested in explaining. 
Considering this dimension of meaning, however, is utterly important for 
reaching a richer understanding of the human context in which the moral 
concepts he is discussing come to matter to us (cf. Rosaldo 1997, 148–149; 
Scheler 2017, 222–223). Intentionally neglecting these features of moral life 
and thought, or disregarding their significance, then, leads to a simplification 
of what is involved in the description of moral reflection, turning it into a 
matter of merely registering an intuitive reaction.
2. Taking the understanding of the research subjects to the 
test too easily
In the three scenarios above, a central feature of our argument was to show 
that depending on the different contexts we imagine, we are not faced with 
the same question when asked whether it was OK for Julie and Mark to make 
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love (cf. Scheler 2017, 222–224). We also stated that a central difficulty is 
knowing what we are to imagine in the given case. Haidt’s discussion, by 
contrast, hinges on the suggestion that we can regard the question “Was it OK 
for them?” as the same question regardless of context. It also presupposes that 
every reason given by the research subjects for disapproving can be treated 
as a rationalization of the same kind of affective response, an intuitive “no”. 
What allows Haidt to disregard individual differences between the 
research subjects, is his conviction that they can give no relevant reason for 
objecting to the story (Haidt 2013, 45–46. Cf. Haidt 2001, 814; Haidt 2006, 
21; Sommers 2005. See also Jacobson 2012, 297–298.). The only reason 
Haidt would accept for thinking that Julie and Mark’s actions are not OK, 
is if they were connected with causing harm, and his story is intentionally 
designed to exclude that option. Therefore, if people allude to potential 
harmful consequences of incestuous action beyond what is mentioned in 
the story, or disapprove for other reasons, say, religious ones, he thinks we 
can discard these apparent reasons, and only look to what causes them to 
disapprove, the underlying process of “moral intuition” (Haidt 2013, 44–47). 
In a related text, Haidt writes:
Moral arguments are much the same [as spontaneous aesthetic judgments]: 
Two people feel strongly about an issue, their feelings come first, and their 
reasons are invented on the fly, to throw at each other. When you refute a 
person’s argument, does she generally change her mind and agree with you? 
Of course not, because the argument you defeated was not the cause of her 
position; it was made up after the judgment was already made. (Haidt 2006, 
21, emphasis added.)
For Haidt, the negative moral judgment is caused by a feeling of disapproval, 
which he perceives as a psychological process of moral intuition (2001, 
817–818). It is immediate, unreflective, and in important respects, non-
verbal. It is, Haidt says, “made automatically (i.e. without intention, effort 
or awareness of process)” (Haidt 2001, 819).
Haidt’s definition of a “moral judgment” departs from more ordinary 
as well as philosophical understandings of what is involved in making 
judgments. In the more ordinary understanding, making judgments, is not 
simply to be equated with having any kind of reaction. Rather it is a well-
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reasoned response; related to the sense in which we can show judgment, 
and even more good judgment, by making well-considered judgments. Such 
good judgments, philosophers have been keen to point out, do not only 
appeal to explanatory reasons, my individual, historical reasons for having 
a certain opinion, but to justificatory reasons, bringing into view relevant 
considerations as to why we should look at a situation in a particular way 
(cf. Juzaszek 2019, 62). 
The philosophical question, therefore, is whether Haidt has good 
reason for treating the unarticulated processes the research subjects undergo 
as moral judgments. Is he justified in describing the registered responses of 
a spontaneous “yes” or “no”, as judgments in the first place? Think of how 
differently people may respond to Haidt’s story. Whereas some people say 
something spontaneously and may thus say things they do not necessarily 
mean, others think carefully before they say anything at all. Why should 
we say that these people are making judgments, and furthermore, the same 
judgment? Could we not rather say that the first ones are only expressing 
their emotions, the second trying to please the experimenter or just find a 
way of ending the experiment (cf. Royzman, Kim & Leeman, 2015, 299), 
and only the third are attempting to articulate a judgment? 
Reflecting on such differences in how articulate and well-considered 
a response is, is necessary to determine whether it is (a) a judgment, and 
moreover (b) the same kind of judgment. Two persons, as it were, might 
answer “no” to Haidt’s question, although their reasons, and whether they do 
have reasons for it, differ and even conflict. Furthermore, deciding whether 
a judgment is (c) a moral judgment, raises additional questions. What 
reasons are we to regard as moral reasons, by contrast to, say, legal or genetic 
considerations? How serious, sincere, or engaged does a judgment need to 
be to express a genuinely moral stance? 
Our point here is not to offer definite criteria for what should count as 
a judgment, or a moral judgment, in the concrete case. It is rather a reminder 
that taking what someone says as a (moral) judgment itself involves an 
evaluation; it constitutes a judgment as to what a (moral) judgment is. Such 
evaluative judgments can be questioned and challenged. On account of our 
ordinary understanding of what a judgment, or a moral judgment, is, Haidt’s 
use of the word can thus be contested. 
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Haidt is aware that he is departing from ordinary and philosophical 
usage in his depiction of moral judgments (Haidt 2001, 817). In fact, he 
endorses such a departure. He says: “To really understand how human 
morality works, […] it may be advisable to shift attention away from moral 
reasoning and toward the study of intuitive and emotional processes.” (Haidt 
2001, 825). Rather than engaging in the study of morality as a question 
of the meaning of normative statements and sensible action in the context 
of people’s lives, his suggestion is thus to study it as a matter of a uniform 
psychological process. “Moral sentiments”, as he sees it, are “[...] built into 
human nature as a set of moral emotions that make us want to return favour 
for favour, insult for insult, tooth for tooth, and eye for eye.” (Haidt 2006, 
50, emphasis added). Moral emotions, in turn, “make sense only as products 
of evolution.” (Haidt 2006, 98). 
This notion of “understanding how human morality works” is 
problematic in at least two respects. First, it presupposes that “human 
morality” works in some definite way and thus serves as a possible object 
for observation and explanation. Second, it treats understanding “human 
morality” as reducible to “understanding” an “emotional process”. By contrast, 
we contend that a fundamental feature of what it means to talk about 
understanding “human morality” or moral judgments is lost if we do not 
know whose moral judgments we are talking about, or if we are completely 
disinterested in the lives of the people who actually make them. Here we lean, 
among others on Max Scheler, who suggests that understanding “whether 
of an act or of its objective significance, is a basic type of participation” (Scheler 
2017, 224). It is through understanding that “one essentially spiritual being 
can enter into” or realize her involvement with “the life of another one” (2017, 
224). Seeking an understanding of morality is thus not to be perceived as an 
explication of “potentially objective mental realities” (Scheler 2017, 225). Rather 
it involves us in the illuminative search for experiential significance and depth in 
an interpersonal relationship, in the search of “knowledge of actual persons and 
the significance of their actual trains of thought” (Scheler 2017, 225). 
Imagine an ethnographic study in which our interest is to understand 
how people think about incest among adult siblings. How could we go about 
answering this question? A first step is to ask them what they think, and not 
just by asking the closed question of whether it is OK, but rather by inquiring 
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more openly into their thoughts. This involves paying attention to their more 
spontaneous reactions, expressions of emotion, possible confusions and 
hesitation, as well as the reasons they give. It is therefore to be expected that 
we ask follow-up questions, such as, “What do you mean?” or “What makes 
you say that?” (see e.g. Winch 1964, 316; 1972, 178; Phillips 2001, 9). In 
the process of such a conversation, we imaginatively try to enter the other 
person’s life-situation. (Cf. Clifford Geertz 1997, 124, who argues that the 
historical and anthropological sciences should provide thick, experience–near, 
descriptions of the lives of the people they study. He suggests that whatever 
use “the imaginative productions of other peoples” which scientists offer “can 
have for our moral lives, […] it cannot be to simplify them.” Geertz 1993, 44.)
What we inquire into here is not just the kind of value judgment a 
person is willing to make when faced with a thought-experiment. We need 
to consider, as Murdoch says, 
something more elusive which may be called their total vision of life, as shown 
in their mode of speech or silence, their choice of words, their assessments 
of others, their conception of their own lives, what they think attractive 
or praiseworthy, what they think funny: in short the configurations of 
their thought which show continually in their reactions and conversations. 
(Murdoch 1997d, 81)
Our interest is in that sense not only their reaction to a specific example, the 
act of passing judgment, but more wide-ranging questions concerning the role 
of sex and sexuality, gender, intimacy, love and family life in their thought. 
We also enter into questions about how one person responds to others. 
Suppose a person rejects incest out of religious conviction. She then finds 
out that two of her family acquaintances, an actual Julie and Mark, have had 
sex. Must we assume that she would also condemn them if she met them in 
the street? Would she refuse to talk with them, or perhaps go as far as taking 
some kind of action against such “sinful” behavior? Or, should we imagine that 
she talks with them as usual, but condemns them when they are not around, 
perhaps thinking that “they will go to hell anyway”? What about a person 
who answers “no” intuitively when confronted with the story, although this 
response fundamentally conflicts with his liberal and progressive attitudes? 
Can we not imagine that such a person would not condemn an actual 
Julie or Mark if they were to meet? That person might even struggle with 
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himself and not understand why his original answer played out to be “no”. 
He might experience a conflict in his own vision of life and find his reaction 
an unwelcome and not particularly likable feature of himself. (cf. Murdoch 
on M, 1997b, 313; Rosaldo 1997, 143–144, 148–149.) 
Seeking to understand what a person means by “no” here, is seeking 
to understand how this word enters another person’s world; and thereby 
also how one relates to that other person’s world and may be challenged by 
it. If we take “understanding” to include such features, Haidt’s experiment 
hardly has the potential of offering us an understanding of “human moral 
life” (Haidt 2001, 829). We know too little about the people in question 
in order to understand them or their “moral judgments”. The disinterested, 
impersonal position we are invited to take, is a hindrance to reflecting 
about morality in meaningful ways. It is, by contrast, a personal, engaged 
perspective that allows us to speak of understanding in the first place. It enters 
in two significant senses. First, as long as we are not speaking of the mere 
transmission of information, a personal background is needed to understand 
what someone says. Second, entering a personal relationship with the one we 
want to understand, requires that we take that person seriously. (Cf. Geertz 
1997, 124, 128.) It is one thing to ask what reasons a person has for saying or 
believing incest is unacceptable, quite another to dictate what the acceptable 
reasons for saying this must be, or that a person has no reason for saying it.
Seeking understanding in the sense we have sketched, is seeking a 
growing complexity; not the ultimate mechanisms of a causal network. It is 
here, that the conceptual resources of Haidt’s account reveal their simplicity. 
By discarding how people themselves think of what they say and do, as well 
as the significance it has for them to do it, or to refrain from doing it, Haidt 
removes essential aspects of human morality. The question then becomes 
whether providing an explanation of a causal network can be equated with 
understanding another person. If it cannot, we should ask what Haidt gains 
by reconceiving understanding the human moral sense in line with offering 
an explanation of “how morality works”.
Haidt is just one among many who have tried to psychologize what is 
involved in understanding human beings. There has long been a philosophical 
cleavage between those desiring to explain human behavior by reference 
to general laws, and those emphasizing the importance of understanding 
individual experiences in the context of the human being and her social 
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world, particularly since the advent of “positive philosophy” (see e.g. the 
logical works of Comte 1839; Mill [1843] 1974; Spencer 1855). At the turn 
of the 20th century two significant attempts to depsychologize logic were 
made by mathematican and logician Gottlob Frege (1884) and founder of 
phenomenology Edmund Husserl ([1913] 2014). Their attempts were in 
part a continuation and in part a departure from the tradition of German 
idealism. This tradition started with Kant’s transcendental idealism, trying to 
formulate the conditions of rational thought, the bounds of the world as we 
know it, and ended with Hegel’s absolute idealism, identifying the world with 
logic and Reason, the movement of thought through History. These thoughts 
were carried over into the phenomenological tradition through Husserl, and 
the analytic tradition through Frege. A central movement seeking to find ways 
of making philosophical sense of psychological  experience was the German 
neo-Kantian and hermeneutic Verstehen philosophies. They emphasized 
the notion of understanding over explanation within the humanities, and 
particularly understanding in the form of interpretation being significantly 
guided by empathy (Einfühlung). As a method in interpretative human studies, 
Einfühlung referred not only to non-psychological attempts to grasp another 
way of thinking (Max Weber), but also to explicitly psychological identifications 
with another person’s point of view and feelings by emotionally seeking the 
same mood (Stimmung) as the ones to be understood (Theodor Lipps). (See 
Stueber 2006 for an overview. For a phenomenological critique of Einfühlung 
see Stein 1989 and Scheler 2017.)
Reacting against the tradition of positivism, Eduard Spranger as one 
representative of this hermeneutic philosophy, remarks, “We understand only 
persons. An impersonal event is not understandable. We can explain it and 
calculate with it; but we can only understand what grows out of the meaningful 
actions among persons” (Spranger [1918] 1980, 31, our translation). The 
picture Spranger criticizes resembles Haidt’s vision of “human morality”, in 
which there are no people as spontaneous and reflective individuals, but only 
people as impersonal minds, which are assumed to function in certain ways (cf. 
Haidt and Björklund 2008, 186–187). Where Haidt talks about understanding 
as a matter of explaining an impersonal and general causal network, Spranger 
links understanding to meaningful action. This does not render impersonal 
events inexplicable. There is thus no decree against the attempt to encircle events 
in explanatory terms. The explanations we may garner in this way, however, lack 
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the feature of entering into another person’s world that is a presupposition for 
speaking about understanding on Spranger’s terms (see also Dilthey [1883] 
1922, 30–31; Scheler [1923] 2017, 222–224; vendler 1997, 205). Reducing 
the question of one’s personal involvement in understanding to the impersonal 
stance seeking explanation risks disregarding people’s visions of life. The 
privileging explanation at the expense of understanding, on this account, is 
therefore not merely an intellectual failure to distinguish understanding from 
explanation, and an action from an event. It is a moral failure to take another 
person seriously. 
Two ways of understanding moral judgments and moral reasoning 
have emerged in our discussion.The first, chosen by Haidt, search for a causal 
mechanism that explains why someone says something. The second seeks to 
understand how people’s words have meaning in their life. By highlighting 
the questions that arise when considering people’s moral judgments in the 
light of their different visions of life, we contend that Haidt treats the research 
subjects as too easy to understand in two fundamental respects.
First, his treatment of their negative answers is too simplistic in taking 
them as the same, regardless of how they substantiate them.  If understanding 
“human morality” is our aim, we have claimed that the question of whether 
two negative answers should be understood as the same is something we 
need to reflect on. It is not something we can presuppose. The only sameness 
we can take for given, is that people answered “no” on a yes or no question. 
This is a very shallow similarity if our aim is to understand people and their 
meaningful actions.
Second, Haidt identifies understanding “human morality” with 
explaining a uniform process and its cause. In other words, he presupposes 
a common cause, which is thought to go beyond people’s personalities and 
what they themselves say. On this basis, people’s reasons are discarded as 
irrelevant, and understanding persons, oddly enough, becomes a matter of 
explaining something impersonal. There remains no question of entering the 
world of another human being on terms that could come to challenge how 
we ourselves think and lives our lives. In this way, very little of what may be 
entailed in understanding human morality, a morality that centrally concerns 
personal understanding as it develops in relationships between human beings, 
is left in his picture. 
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3. Conclusion
At the end of the article “vision and Choice in Morality”, Murdoch writes, 
There is perhaps in the end no peace between those who think that morality 
is complex and various, and those who think it is simple and unitary, or 
between those who think that other people are usually hard to understand 
and those who think they are usually easy to understand. All one can do is 
try to lay one’s cards on the table. (Murdoch 1997d, 98).
She here forms a link between thinking about morality as “complex and 
various”, and perceiving people as “usually hard to understand”, by contrast 
to thinking of morality as “simple and unitary” and people as “usually easy to 
understand”. Taking up this linkage, we have shown how morality and moral 
reflection appear when it is thought of as “complex and various” (Murdoch 
1997d, 98) rather than theorized as “simple and unitary” (Murdoch 1997d, 
98). We have rejected the idea that one could discern a “certain rationality, 
universality, consistency” in the “form of morality irrespective of its content” 
(Murdoch 1997a, 177), and shown how such an understanding comes out 
in Haidt’s research. 
There is evidence for such a view of morality in his seeking to explain 
moral judgment as a uniform process of moral intuitions, and regarding moral 
reflection as centrally concerned with passing judgments on easily discernible 
facts. Assuming he can establish that there is nothing objectionable in his 
story is only one way in which he fails to acknowledge the deeply normative 
character of his descriptions of moral life. Committing himself to the idea that 
all good reasons for condemning an action morally need to be concerned with 
potentially harmful consequences is another. Assuming moral judgments are 
of the form, it is OK, or not OK, to do this, and that moral reflection centrally 
involves passing judgments on actions are other substantial moral philosophical 
commitments that we did not have the space to fully address here. 
Both Haidt and Murdoch are interested describing human moral life, 
particularly our moral psychology. Murdoch’s philosophy shows an acute 
attentiveness to the moral struggles and challenges that providing such 
descriptions evince. Haidt’s work exemplifies an aspect of today’s ethics 
that, according to nora Hämäläinen, shows “too little appreciation of the 
philosophical import of descriptive work and the philosophical hazards involved 
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in such work” (Hämäläinen 2016, 3, emphasis added). The emphasis is on 
the philosophical here, since part of the problem in Haidt’s account is the 
idea that understanding human morality can be psychologized. 
now, if there is indeed “no peace” to be found among those who, as we 
do, think that there is a need to pay closer attention to the descriptions that 
moral philosophers, as well as moral psychologists give of morality, and those 
who in their work hurry past the intricacies of such descriptions, not sensing 
how hazardous it is, one may ask what this exercise will accomplish. If these 
differences indeed point to a difference in how one views the task of moral 
philosophy, and moral psychology, that is not limited to thinking about the 
disciplines, but also reveals a difference in one’s attitude to life, one’s total 
vision, it is unlikely that our counterparts will be impressed by what we say. 
Although we do not hope for a conversion in the ones who think that 
“people are easy to understand”, as a result of our discussion, there are two 
things that can be said in support of it. The first has to do with clarity when 
it comes to descriptions of morality. The work we have done here can itself be 
seen as a way of clarifying the issues at hand by giving a more detailed picture 
of where our problems lie in reflecting on the story of Julie and Mark, rather 
than presenting an alternative normative argument as to why incest can be 
both felt and thought of as wrong. The second, connected point, is concerned 
with the power of argument in moral philosophy. (See Diamond, 1995ac). 
Haidt’s outspoken ambition to leave rationalist models of moral 
reasoning behind for the sake of an intuitive approach was motivated by what 
he took to be a realization that moral arguments cannot be, or are only seldom, 
refuted by reasoning. This he took as proof that intuitive responses guide 
moral judgments. Something similar can be said of deep-seated intellectual 
commitments, “configurations of […] thought”, as Murdoch (1997d, 81) 
would say. These are not the products of reasoning and argumentation, 
but expressive of the way in which we see the world. Thus, as Haidt may 
agree, they are difficult to target by reason and argument. nevertheless, any 
form of philosophical reflection, including the one in neighboring scientific 
disciplines, should strive to bring forth such unquestioned assumptions to 
reach a point where proponents of different visions of morality lay their 
“cards on the table” (Murdoch 1997d, 98).
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